Steven Carr says…
“What is Molinism?

In every conceivable set of circumstances, free agents like us will choose one particular way. ”

Is that really true? If a free agent is put in a set of identical circumstances a million times, will that free agent choose a particular way each and every time? If a free agent chooses differently one time out of a bazillion, then counterfactuals simply don’t exist.

The second problem I have is that I don’t see how the existence of counterfactuals leave an agent free.

If there is one and only one choice an agent could possibly make in a given circumstance, then his choice is determined. It is determined by that agent’s personality, sure, but it is still determined. It is part of that agent’s make-up that it will choose a certain way when given a certain choice. I don’t see how this is any different than unfree agents.

The cleaner solution is to agree that the choices of free agents don’t exist until that free agent makes the choice. God doesn’t need to be required to have knowledge of choices that don’t exist.

It’s also an explanation that fits with Scripture, which I believe is a revelation of God’s thoughts.

Really?

Yes, God could have created a world where evil didn’t exist, but He choose to allow evil because it allowed for some greater goods (i.e. mature Christian character, love, perseverance) to develop.

So the restriction which prevents God creating a world where our counterfactuals are such that we choose good, is that God wouldn’t want to allow such a world to actualize?

Why do you say that LFW has no cause? What aspect about it isn’t caused? Of course, they are things that influence our choices. LFW just holds that each person is a free moral agent (an unmoved mover). The choice originates from within the chooser.

I confused Craig with God!

How can libertarian free will be demonstrated? How could an action be proved to have had no cause?

It depends on how you want it demonstrated. What criteria would you allow into court? Scripture? Philosophical arguments?

I don’t get what you mean when you say, “So why does God think that Molinism imposes restrictions on which world God can actualise? ”

Maybe you should ask Him. I can’t read God’s mind.

Neither of those things can be demonstrated.

As can be seen from the analysis, there is a counterfactual of freedom that allows God to create a world where I freely choose coffee.

There is also a counterfactual of freedom that allows God to create a world where I freely choose tea.

So why does God think that Molinism imposes restrictions on which world God can actualise? (There is no world where I freely choose cocoa, but that restriction on God has nothing to do with Molinism)

You make a great point in saying that it’s logically possible. That’s great.

But the more important question is whether it’s true.